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Ipock v. Gilmore: North Carolina's Refusal to Extend
Recovery to the Infant Secondary Tort Victim
The history of recovery for interference with the family relationship has
been one of almost continual extension. Presently, courts are demonstrating an
increasing proclivity to recognize the viability of a cause of action by a minor
child for loss of the society, care, support, and affection of a negligently injured
parent. This trend is consistent with the greater amenability of courts and legis-
latures to recognize a cause of action for invasion of intangible, sentimental
interests.
This Note examines the developmeht of the right of a minor child to main-
tain a cause of action for loss of parental consortium and analyzes the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' decision to deny recognition of such a claim in Ipock
v. Gilmore 1 in light of the emerging recognition of rights and remedies for intan-
gible injuries in the North Carolina judicial system. The Note concludes that
the Gilmore court's refusal to recognize this cause of action is inconsistent with
the propensity of modem courts and legislators to recognize a cause of action for
indirect invasions of intangible interests.
In Gilmore, Judith Hill, a wife and mother, was admitted to a local hospital
to undergo a minor sterilization procedure.2 During the course of the procedure
the attending physician, Dr. Gilmore, discovered a cystic mass and chronic in-
fection. He determined that a total abdominal hysterectomy was required and
performed the procedure immediately.3
Post-operatively, Mrs. Hill was noted to be dazed and confused; subse-
quently, she was diagnosed as having suffered hypoxic brain damage during the
course of the hysterectomy.4 Mrs. Hill, through her guardian ad litem, Barbara
Ipock, and Mrs. Hill's husband and son, instituted an action against Dr. Gil-
more and a number of other defendants, including an anesthesiologist, a nurse
anesthetist, and Lenoir Memorial Hospital, for damages for the injuries suffered
by Mrs. Hill and her family.5 The trial court allowed Dr. Gilmore's subsequent
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs excepted to this allowance and the
case proceeded against the remaining defendants. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff against these defendants.
Meanwhile, plaintiffs had appealed the trial court's order granting defend-
ant Gilmore's motion for summary judgment. The North Carolina Court of
1. 85 N.C. App. 70, 354 S.E.2d 315, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 169, 358 S.E.2d 52 (1987).
2. Id. Mrs. Hill was admitted to Lenoir Memorial Hospital for the purpose of undergoing an
elective, permanent sterilization procedure known as a "laparoscopy." During the course of a
laparoscopy, small incisions are made in the abdominal wall, a laparoscope is inserted in the incision,
and the fallopian tubes are sealed with an electric current. The patient is generally released from the
hospital on the same day. See THa AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS,
STERILIZATION BY LAPAROSCOPY (Feb. 1978).
3. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 71, 354 S.E.2d at 316.
4. Id. The brain damage was caused by a deprivation of oxygen to the brain during or imme-
diately following the surgery.
5. Id.
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Appeals vacated that order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 6
Thereafter, Dr. Gilmore filed a motion for partial summary judgment, alleging
that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the minor plaintiff's
claim for loss of parental consortium.7 The trial court allowed this motion and
dismissed the minor's claim. Plaintiffs appealed from this judgment.
On appeal, the Gilmore court identified a number of factors justifying its
decision affirming the trial court. First, the court reasoned that although the
loss of parental consortium may be a tangible injury worthy of compensation,
initial recognition of the cause of action would fall within the province of the
legislature.8 Second, the court asserted that it was not "constitutionally re-
quired," 9 on either equal protection or due process grounds, to treat an action
for loss of parental consortium in the same manner as it treated an action for
loss of spousal consortium'0 or an action for wrongful death." Finally, the
Gilmore court was influenced by a number of policy arguments: (1) the possibil-
ity of overlapping recovery; (2) concern for potential increases in insurance
costs; (3) the derivative nature and indirectness of the injury; (4) the uncertainty
and remoteness of damage; and (5) concerns for a profusion of tort litigation.12
Thus, the Gilmore court, although conceding the validity of the child's claim,
disallowed recovery on the grounds that "there must be a line drawn which ends
a tort-feasor's liability at some point."'13 The Gilmore court elected to draw that
line short of recognition of a child's claim for loss of a parent's support and
affection.
At common law, under the doctrine of paterfamilias, an injury to the fam-
ily was an injury to the father; neither children nor wives could bring actions in
their own names to recover for personal injury.14 Actions for loss of consortium
6. Id. Under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure a motion for summary judgment
can be sustained only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 56 (1983); see Gore v. Hill, 52 N.C.
App. 620, 279 S.E.2d 102, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 710, 296 S.E.2d 656 (1981). In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence most favorably to the opposing
party. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 56.
7. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 72, 354 S.E.2d at 316.
8. Id. at 73, 354 S.E.2d at 317.
9. Id. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 317. Plaintiffs had asserted that to deny a child's independent cause
of action for loss of a child's consortium, when North Carolina law otherwise permits a parent's
separate action for loss of a child's consortium as well as an independent action for loss of spousal
consortium, violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Brief for Appellant at 16-18, Ipock v. Gilmore, 73 N.C. App. 182, 326 S.E.2d 271, disc, rev. denied,
314 N.C. 116, 322 S.E.2d 481 (1985).
10. The court stated that the elements of "consortium" differed markedly in a spousal relation-
ship and in a parent-child relationship; as such, it would not be anomalous to allow recovery to
spouses and to deny recovery to children of an injured individual. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 74, 354
S.E.2d at 317.
11. The court noted that the distinction between a wrongful death action and an action for loss
of parental consortium was "not between kinds of children, but between a defendant's scope of
liability for causing fatal as distinct from nonfatal injuries." Id.
12. Id. at 74-75, 354 S.E.2d at 318.
13. Id. at 75, 354 S.E.2d at 318.
14. See, eg., Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L. REV. 16, 18 (1947)
([T]he main idea which governs the law of husband and wife is... that of the guardianship...
which the husband has over the wife and over her property.").
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developed at common law in the context of suits by a husband for damages for
interference with the marital relationship.1 5 Originally, courts considered the
wife's position to be comparable to that of a servant; the analogy to loss of serv-
ices was frequently employed to justify the husband's claim for compensation. 16
Eventually the services requirement was largely abandoned and recovery under
a cause of action for loss of consortium was extended to include interferences
with sentimental interests such as love, affection, society, and companionship.
17
A married woman had no cause of action at common law for loss of consor-
tium. The wife, considered an "inferior" being, was deemed to have no property
right in the services or companionship of her spouse.18 The advent of the Mar-
ried Women's Acts in 1913 profoundly changed the wife's legal status.19 Mar-
ried women were relieved of their common-law disabilities and sanctioned to
contract and maintain actions in their individual capacities. 20 It was not until
1950, however, in Hittafer v. Argonne21 that a court recognized a wife's claim
for loss of her husband's consortium resulting from the negligent acts of a third
party. In Hittafer a woman brought an action against her husband's employer
when her husband sustained severe and permanent injuries while in appellee's
employ. The defendant-appellee moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the trial court granted this
motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, not-
15. See, e.g., Young v. Pridd, 4 Cro. 89, 79 Eng. Rep. 679 (Ex. Ch. 1626); Hyde v. Scyssor, 3
Cro. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1619).
16. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 653 (1930) ("[T]he
very nature of the relationship and the duties which it imposed on the wife together with her inferi-
ority and subservience easily gave to the husband proprietary interest in her, and in turn led to
proprietary actions for the loss of her services."); see also 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 241 (4th ed. 1979) ("Since the wife, like a servant, was considered a chattel, the basis for the
husband's action for interference in the marital relationship was one of trespass.").
17. See, eg., Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811, 818 (D.C. Cir.) ("The loss of 'services' is an
outworn fiction."), cert denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 12, 78
A. 582, 584 (1911) ("[services] not so much those which resulted in wages earned, or from the mere
performance of labor, as those which found expression at the domestic fireside, and in all manner of
aid, assistance and helpfulness in all the relations of domestic life.").
18. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142-43 (4th ed.
1916) ("the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as
the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or
injury."). See also W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS
199 (1984) ("For this viewpoint, the law had both the warrant of the Old Testament and the teach-
ings of St. Paul respecting the hegemony of the man and the subjection of the wife.").
19. See generally Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 1341 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Treatment] (examination of actionable injury to family
relationships caused by negligently inflicted loss of consortium).
20. The married women's provision in the North Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided that a
wife's property no longer automatically became that of her husband upon marriage. N.C. CONST.
art. X, § 6. The legislature further clarified the wife's legal position in 1913, providing that any
damage for her own personal injuries could be recovered by a wife suing alone. The General Assem-
bly eventually adopted legislation which provided that
[TJhe earnings of a married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal services, and
any damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be recovered by her
suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property as fully
as if she had remained unmarried.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1913), amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1965). See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 861 (4th ed. 1971).
21. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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ing that the term "consortium" included not only material services but also love,
affection, and companionship, "all welded into a conceptualistic unity," con-
cluded that a wife was entitled to a cause of action for loss of her husband's
consortium occasioned by a third person's negligent actions, notwithstanding
the dearth of explicit authority allowing recovery under these circumstances.
The North Carolina courts did not definitively recognize a wife's cause of
action for loss of her husband's consortium until 1980. In Nicholson v. Memo-
rial Hospital2 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly overruled fifty-five
years of established precedent which had consistently denied a wife's action on
her own behalf for loss of her husband's consortium.23 Arguing that those cases
"stripped" both spouses of a right to recover for what was a very real injury to
the marital partnership, the court determined that "[s]uch denuding contradicts
the policy of modem law to expand liability in an effort to afford decent compen-
sation as a measure to those injured by the wrongful conduct of others."2 4 The
Nicholson court rejected defendant's argument that any anomalies inherent in
the previous decisions should be rectified by legislative action, reasoning that
"[i]n view of [an extensive] history of judicial activity [in this area], we do not
believe legislative fiat is necessary." '25
The common law traditionally has recognized a parent's interest in freedom
from tortious conduct harming his relationship with his child.26 The analogy of
the loss of services of a servant was utilized as the basis for a parent's right to
recover for damages resulting from torts directed against the child.2 7 As in the
case of spousal consortium, however, most jurisdictions have abandoned the re-
quirement that the loss of services underlie recovery for loss of consortium in the
context of the parent-child relationship.
The parent's interest in maintaining a cause of action for the loss of a
child's consortium against a negligent third party was initially recognized in the
1974 Wisconsin decision Shockley v. Prier.28 In Shockley an infant was perma-
nently blinded and disfigured as a result of defendant-physician's negligence. 29
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in allowing the parents of that infant to bring an
action for the loss of the injured child's aid, comfort, society, and companion-
ship, reasoned that since Wisconsin's wrongful death statute "already recognizes
22. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
23. See Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); accord Helm-
stetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
24. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 300, 266 S.E.2d at 821 (citing Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass.
153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973)).
25. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823. The court asserted that defendant's argu-
ment against the court's "activist" role "overlooks the fact that this entire area of the law has been
developed by judicial decree." Id.
26. Note, Judicial Treatment, supra note 19, at 1346.
27. See, eg., W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 124, at 882. ("In order to prevail [in an action for
tortious injury to his child, a] father had to show actual loss of his child's services. In time, a doc-
trine of constructive loss of services developed. If a child was a minor and the father had a right to
his or her services, the child was presumed to be a servant.")
28. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1974).
29. Id. at 395, 225 N.W.2d at 496-97. Plaintiff had given birth to twins prematurely at defend-
ant hospital. Only one child survived; he was placed in an infant care unit. The child was allegedly
given excessive amounts of oxygen, which resulted in permanent blindness and disfigurement.
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the loss of society and companionship as an element of damages in the case of
death [it was reasonable] to recognize this same type loss where there has been
injury to a minor child."30
In North Carolina, bodily injuries to an unemancipated minor automati-
cally give rise to a cause of action by the parent to recover for loss of services of
the child during minority. Although this cause of action was traditionally justi-
fied on the grounds that the parent had suffered a purely pecuniary loss as a
result of the tortious conduct of another,3 1 the parents' right of action today is
based not only on the right to services of the child but also on their duty to care
for and maintain the child. 32 Although no current authority explicitly repudi-
ates the notion that a parent's loss is purely pecuniary in nature, the supreme
court in Nicholson expressly rejected the notion that loss of services provides the
totality of the measure of damages in a loss of consortium action and established
that "the better view is that it embraces service, society, companionship....
[and other] tangible and intangible benefits." '33
Significantly, in North Carolina a parent may maintain a tort action for
damages against one who, without privilege to do so, abducts the minor or in-
duces her to leave home without parental consent.34 The "real" cause of action
in these situations is deemed to be the interference with the parent-child rela-
tionship; no proof of loss of the services of the child is required.35 In either of
these actions the damages may include the parent's loss of society of his child
and the consequent emotional distress. One court noted,
The true ground of the action is the outrage and oppression; the injury
the father sustains in the loss of his child; the insult offered to his feel-
ings; the heartrending agony he must suffer in the destruction of his
deepest hopes, and the irreparable loss of that comfort and society
which may be the only solace of his declining age.3
6
Coincidentally, minor children have begun to enjoy status as independent legal
entities and possess specific rights of their own.37 The United States Supreme
30. Id. at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499. See also Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d
382, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669 (1974) (No reasonable distinction can be drawn between the
right of parents, in appropriate circumstances, to seek recovery for lost comfort, society, and com-
panionship of an injured and totally helpless child and the right of a spouse, in similar circum-
stances, to recover for loss of consortium.).
31. See 3 R. LEE, supra note 16, § 241.
32. See R. LIGON, NORTH CAROLINA CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 233 (1963).
33. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
34. See R. LEE, supra note 16, §§ 242-43.
35. See Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413, 107 S.E. 577 (1921); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283,
78 S.E. 222 (1913).
36. Little, 181 N.C. at 415, 107 S.E. at 580.
37. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
17 (1967); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In 1916 Dean Roscoe
Pound wrote,
As against the world at large a child has an interest.. . in the society and affection of the
parent, at least while he remains in the household. But the law has done little to secure
these interests. At common law there are no legal rights which protect them.... It will
have been observed that legal securing of the interests of children falls far short of what
general considerations would appear to demand.
1988] TORTS
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Court has systematically recognized a minor's right to first amendment free-
doms, 38 equal protection, 39 and due process of law.4° In juvenile proceedings
the Court has begun to apply the constitutional protections associated with adult
criminal prosecutions.4 1 This growing recognition that children "are entitled to
assert individual interests in their own right, and to have fair consideration given
to their claims" has led an increasing number of courts to recognize that a mi-
nor's claim for relief for invasions of intangible, sentimental interests "carr[ies] a
logical and sympathetic appeal." 42 Consequently, these courts have been willing
to abandon established precedent in order to conform their decisions to evolving
conditions of society and more enlightened views as to the rights and privileges
of its citizens.4 3
In North Carolina, courts uniformly permit an unemancipated minor child
to recover directly for his mental and physical pain and suffering and the impair-
ment of his future earning capacity.44 Similarly, the North Carolina legislature,
in its promulgation of the Wrongful Death Act, implied that children may re-
cover damages for wrongful death of a parent.45 Enumerated damages specifi-
cally include the "[s]ociety, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices
and advice of the decedent."'4 6 Thus, North Carolina courts and legislators have
recognized that loss of "consortium" over and beyond loss of sexual services is a
viable form of compensable damage for both adults and minors. As such, it
would be an anomaly to allow a child to recover for such losses occasioned by
the death of his parent but to deny recovery to a child who has suffered identical
losses occasioned by a debilitating injury to his parent.
In spite of the growing inclination of the courts to extend recognition to
claims of minors for invasion of intangible interests associated with the parent-
child relationship, most courts have refused to recognize a child's claim for loss
of consortium when that loss was caused by a third party's negligent behavior.47
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 U. MICH. L. Rnv. 177, 185-86 (1916). In
1971, Dean William Prosser commented:
It is not easy to understand or appreciate this reluctance to compensate the child who has
been deprived of the care, companionship and education of his mother, or for that matter,
his father, through the defendant's negligence. This is surely a genuine injury, and a seri-
ous one, which has received a great deal more sympathy from the legal writers than from
the judges.
W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 25, at 896.
38. See, eg., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
39. See, eg., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
40. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972).
41. See, eg., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 745, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (2d Dist. 1975).
43. See Comment, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympa-
thetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 231, 239-40 (1975).
44. See, eg., White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (1983).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4)(b) to (c) (1983).
47. See, eg., Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.D.C. 1952) ("This court
confesses that it has been difficult for it on the basis of natural justice to reach the conclusion that
this type of an action will not lie."); Hankins v. Denby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862
(1972).
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Many of the courts refusing to recognize this cause of action do not consider the
claim to be entirely without merit; rather, they are convinced that compelling
policy concerns militate against the child's right of action.4 8
In Borer v. American Airlines,49 the seminal 1977 case addressing this cause
of action, the California Supreme Court rejected the contention that "logical
symmetry" compelled it to recognize a cause of action for loss of affection and
society between a parent and a child simply because it had recognized such a
cause of action in the context of the marital relationship. The Borer court con-
ceded that "there can be little question of the reality of the loss suffered by a
child deprived of the society and care of its parents."' 50 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that
taking into account all considerations which bear on this question, in-
cluding the inadequacy of monetary compensation to alleviate [a fam-
ily] tragedy, the difficulty of measuring damages, and the danger of
imposing extended and disproportionate liability, we should not recog-
nize a non-statutory cause of action for the loss of parental
consortium.5 '
For many years, variations on the arguments advanced in Borer were utilized in
every court addressing the issue of a child's recovery for loss of parental
consortium.52
Recently, however, some courts have begun to take an increasingly activist
role in shaping the rights and interests of minors. In the 1980 case Ferriter v.
Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.53 the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided, as a
matter of first impression, that a child was entitled to recover for loss of parental
consortium brought about by a third party's negligence. In Ferriter an employee
of a construction company was injured when a wood beam fell from a poorly
constructed nylon sling. His wife and children, in their individual capacities,
brought an action to recover for loss of his consortium and society.5 4 The court,
considering the case comparable to both a wrongful death action and an action
for loss of spousal consortium, found itself "virtually compelled" to recognize
the children's interest in parental society, affection, and companionship.5 5
Since the Ferriter decision an increasing number of courts have recognized
a child's claim for loss of parental consortium. In so doing they have considered
48. The most frequently cited grounds for denial of a child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium include: (1) danger of double recovery, (2) remoteness or speculativeness of damages,
(3) increasing litigation and multiplicity of actions, (4) possible adverse effect on family harmony,
(5) absence of a legally recognized right on the part of minor children to their parent's society and
companionship, and (6) the inadequacy of the judicial system to compensate for such a loss. Anno-
tation, Child's Action-Loss of Parental Attention, 11 A.L.R. 4th 550 (1982).
49. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858 (1977).
50. Id. at 453, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 314, 563 P.2d at 842.
51. Id.
52. See, eg., Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Mere-
dith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1957); Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal. Rptr.
110 (2d Dist. 1975).
53. 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
54. Id. at 510, 413 N.E.2d at 693.
55. Id. at 512, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
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and rejected many of the traditional objections to recognition of this cause of
action.56 In Berger v. Weber 57 the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed the argu-
ment that it would be "anomalous" to allow a child to recover for negligent
invasion of his family interest when he would be specifically prohibited from
recovery for intentional, direct invasion of the family interest under a Michigan
statute that barred suits for alienation of affections, asserting that "[w]e are satis-
fied that the real anomaly is to allow a child's recovery for the loss of a parent's
society and companionship when the loss attends the parent's death but to deny
such recovery when the loss attends the parent's injury."58
Similarly, in Weitl v. Moes59 the Supreme Court of Iowa rejected the con-
tention that it would be paradoxical to protect against negligent interference
with a child's interest in parental companionship when Iowa law did not protect
that interest from intentional interference by way of an alienation of affections
action. 6° The court reasoned that "[t]he distinction [between the two situations]
is not between intentional and negligent torts... [but between] recovery when
the consortium is lost because the spouse voluntarily abandons the marital rela-
tionship, with the encouragement of a third party... [and when] the spouse is
involuntarily injured by a third party."' 61 Recently in Reighley v. Playtex 62 the
United States District Court in Colorado held that the existence of wrongful
death legislation which provided that children had a statutory right to share in
any judgment recovered demonstrated that the state legislature had declared its
responsibility to protect and foster the parent-child relationship. 63 The court
concluded that "[a] parent's interest to be free from tortious conduct harming
his spouse or child is equally that of the child who looks to his parents for care,
security, nurture and guidance." 64
Ipock v. Gilmore presented the North Carolina Court of Appeals with the
opportunity to consider a minor's claim for the wrongful loss of a parent's care,
guidance, society, and training. The Gilmore court, in denying recognition of a
cause of action for loss of parental consortium, identified and was persuaded by
a number of classic objections to recognition of this cause of action. The Gil-
more court's decision ostensibly was consistent with established case law. The
North Carolina courts had directly addressed the issue of recognition of a claim
for loss of parental consortium in two prior decisions. In both cases the courts
56. See eg., Reighley v. Playtex, 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985); Berger v. Weber, 411
Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981).
57. 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981).
58. Id. at 3, 303 N.W.2d at 426.
59. 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981).
60. Id. at 270.
61. Id. at 266-67.
62. 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1081. See also Kelly v. T.L. James Co., 603 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1985) (children
of seaman allowed to recover for loss of society of injured parent under maritime law); Glicklich v.
Spievach, 16 Mass. App. 488, 452 N.E.2d 287 (minor son allowed to sue for injury to mother),
appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344
N.W.2d 514 (1984) (minor child may recover for loss of parent's society caused by negligent injury
to parent).
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refused to recognize the cause of action. Those cases, however, are readily dis-
tinguishable from Gilmore.
Initially the Gilmore court relied on the supreme court's rejection of a claim
for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in Henson v. Thomas65 to
augment its decision to deny the minor's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium. In Henson two minor children, acting through their father as "next
friend," instituted an action against a third party for damages for wrongfully
disrupting the family circle, which had deprived the children of the affection,
companionship, guidance, and care of their parents.66 The supreme court re-
fused to entertain the action, reasoning that because the cause of action was
unknown to the common law, and was not created by any statute, the court
could not "[create] a cause of action." 67 The Gilmore court, in relying on Hen-
son, however, failed to address a number of vital distinctions between an action
for loss of parental consortium in which an injury has occurred because of a
third party's negligence and an action for loss of parental consortium in a suit
for alienation of affections. Alienation of affections is a disfavored cause of ac-
tion; strong public policy concerns dictate that tort litigation among family
members be minimized. Conversely a cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium does not encourage family disharmony; on the contrary, family members
are united in a cause of action against a negligent or reckless third party. Also,
the Henson court rejected the cause of action for loss of parental consortium
partially on the rationale that a parent's decision whether or not to provide love
and comfort to a child "are matters within [a parent's] keeping. The measure of
[a parent's] contribution is controlled by [his or her] willingness and capacity." '68
The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would mean that every time a
person persuades or induces a mother to engage in [time-consuming activities],
that person commits a tort for which he may be compelled to respond in dam-
ages." 69 However, this concern about prospective frivolous litigation would be
of no significance in the context of a suit for loss of parental consortium when a
parent has been injured by a negligent third party. The nature of a personal
injury claim requires that a final legal judgment be obtained for the harm in-
flicted. Thus recovery under a cause of action for loss of parental consortium
would be limited to a single judgment or settlement. Finally, the Henson deci-
sion antedates the recent movements in the North Carolina courts and legisla-
ture toward recognizing equal rights for minors. A principal reason in Henson
for denying the children's claim was that the children had no legal entitlement to
their parent's society and companionship. This argument is no longer tenable in
light of the North Carolina General Assembly's enactment of a wrongful death
statute under which the children of a deceased individual are entitled, presuma-
bly, to recover damages for loss of the elements of "comfort, society, compan-
65. 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
66. Id. at 174, 56 S.E.2d at 433.
67. Id. at 176, 56 S.E.2d at 434.
68. Id. at 175, 56 S.E.2d at 434.
69. Id.
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ionship, and affection."'70 Henson was decided many years prior to the present
acknowledgement that minor children are entitled to most of the due process
and constitutional privileges accorded to adults. The court's reliance on the
Henson court's justification for denying recognition of a loss of consortium ac-
tion by a minor child was misplaced, as that rationale has been largely abrogated
by subsequent judical and legislative action.
The Gilmore court also found persuasive the court of appeals' recent refusal
to recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium in Azzolino v.
Dingfelder.7 1 In Azzolino minor siblings of a Down's Syndrome child brought
an action to recover for the damages allegedly suffered by them as a result of the
"wrongful birth" of that child.72 The siblings claimed that they had been dam-
aged by their brother's birth in that they would suffer financial and emotional
hardship by having a Down's Syndrome child in the family.7 3 They argued that
they were deprived of the full measure of the society, comfort, care and protec-
tion of their parents because of the extraordinary demands placed on them by
the Down's Syndrome child. 74 The Azzolino court rejected this claim on the
rationale that "[tihere is no 'proportional' share of their parents' worldly goods
to which the children are entitled .. . .",7 Azzolino, however, is readily distin-
guishable from Gilmore in that the children in Azzolino still had full access to
their parent's society and affection. Conversely, the Gilmore minor, as the child
of a parent who has been "rendered but a spectre of [his or her] former self" has
suffered an irretrievable loss.
The Gilmore court also categorically rejected a number of substantive argu-
ments advanced by plaintiffs. The court summarily dismissed plaintiffs' conten-
tion that it would be a denial of both due process and equal protection to
recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium for a spouse but to deny that
same cause of action to a child.76 The court asserted that because "companion-
ship, service, responsibility, love and affection differ in both degree and kind"
between spouses and parent and child, the law is not "constitutionally required"
to treat these relationships as identical. 77 This argument overlooks the prevail-
ing rationale for extending recognition to claims for loss of intangible interests in
the first place: the loss is a "definite injury to a legitimate interest"; as such,
victims are entitled to redress by due process of law. Arguably it is far more
debilitating for a child to experience abrupt disruption of a filial relationship
than it is for an adult. The child will not have had comparable opportunities to
develop emotional mechanisms to cope with unexpected loss; consequently the
effect of the deprivation may hinder significantly the child's emotional and psy-
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4)(b) to (c) (1983).
71. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 315 N.C. 103, 337
S.E.2d 528 (1985) (supreme court found no cause of action for the siblings' claim).
72. Id. at 303, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 305, 322 S.E.2d at 572.
76. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 572.
77. Id. at 75, 354 S.E.2d at 317.
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chological development. Thus children may have a measurably greater need for
compensation designed to mitigate the effects of emotional deprivation.78
Similarly the Gilmore court rejected the equal protection and due process
arguments in the context of North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act.79 The court
maintained that "[t]he distinction is not between kinds of children but between a
defendant's scope of liability for causing fatal as distinct from non-fatal injuries
to the people who are the immediate victims of his or her negligence."' 80 In
making this distinction the court again failed to consider the rationale for recog-
nizing a cause of action for loss of consortium it espoused in Nicholson: the
belief that the "awesome permanent deprivation" stemming from the loss of an
immediate family member's consortium caused by a defendant's negligence
should be compensated.81 The child of a brain-damaged parent suffers no less
devastating deprivation than the child of a deceased parent. Both are denied the
loss of a parent's support and care during critical formative years.
The Gilmore court recited a litany of practical considerations supporting its
denial of recognition for a child's loss of parental consortium. These include
(1) the possibility of multiplicity of suits,8 2 (2) potential increase in insurance
costs,8 3 (3) inability of the jury to cope adequately with the question of damages
because of the uncertainty and remoteness of the damages and because of the
injury's derivative and indirect nature, and (4) the possibility of overlapping re-
covery between the uninjured spouse and the child. 84 However, an increasing
number of courts are considering and rejecting these "practical" arguments, ar-
guing that these problems can be dealt with "in a fashion less draconian than
[total denial of] a cause of action for loss of consortium."8 5 For example, com-
pulsory joinder of suits could be required of immediate family members.8 6 Al-
ternatively, potential problems of overlapping recovery could be resolved by use
of explicit jury instructions specifying that children are entitled to an independ-
ent cause of action, or strict criteria could be instituted mandating early dismis-
sal of spurious suits on summary judgment grounds. Juries have proved
themselves capable of grappling with the uncertainties associated with conjec-
78. See generally Johnson and Rosenblatt, Grief Following Childhood Loss of a Parent, 35 AM.
J. PSYCHOTHERAPY (July 1981) Oinking early parent death to later adult depression, schizophrenia,
and sociopathic behavior).
79. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App at 74, 354 N.C. at 317.
80. Id. at 75, 354 S.E.2d at 317.
81. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 820.
82. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 74-75, 354 S.E.2d at 318.
83. The possibility that recognition of consortium claims would adversely impact on insurance
costs was soundly dismissed by the Berger court. The court noted:
Compensating a child who has suffered emotional problems because of the deprivation of a
parent's love and affection may provide the child with the means of adjustment to the loss.
The child receives the immediate benefit of the compensation, but society will also benefit if
the child is able to function without emotional handicap. This may well offset any increase
in insurance premiums.
Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 3, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981).
84. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 75, 354 S.E.2d at 318.
85. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 303, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
86. Id. Compulsory joinder or limiting the cause of action to immediate family members are
among the alternatives advanced by a number of courts.
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tural damages in wrongful death and spousal consortium suits; they are equally
capable of managing 'comparable problems in the context of a child's claim for
recovery for loss of parental consortium. The danger of massive increases in
litigation has been raised as an objection to almost every new cause of action.
The inevitable response to this argument is that "the existence of a multitude of
claims merely shows society's pressing need of legal redress." Administrative
difficulties "must not frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every
substantive wrong."8 7
The Gilmore court concluded that recognition of a minor's cause of action
for loss of parental consortium would fall strictly within the province of the
legislature.8 8 In the common-law system, however, action for loss of consortium
has been created and developed by the judiciary. 9 The courts have been instru-
mental in recognizing and defining justiciable issues in actions involving rela-
tional interests. Furthermore, the Gilmore court's rationale is inconsistent with
the North Carolina Supreme Court's reasoning in Nicholson that "in view of [the
fact that the primary instrument of evolution in the common law system is the
judiciary and not the legislature] we do not believe legislative fiat is necessary." 90
This reasoning applies with equal force to a situation in which children are irrep-
arably harmed by the loss of a parent's consortium.
Courts cannot abdicate their role as arbiters of justice merely because rec-
ognition of a new cause of action would involve administrative difficulties.
When an inestimable interest of a child is directly involved, the child's rights
should be recognized and enforced, and lack of precedent in a particular juris-
diction cannot absolve a court from responsibility for adjudicating each claim
that comes before it on its merits. A child who has been deprived of the care
and companionship of a parent through the negligent actions of a third party has
been severely injured. As such, the child is entitled to compensation from the
wrongdoer. The North Carolina Court of Appeals' refusal to recognize this
cause of action and the North Carolina Supreme Court's subsequent denial of
certiorari in Gilmore simply serve to ensure that the loss to children of the sup-
port, aid, and companionship of a parent during crucial formative years will not
be redressed. One can only hope that if the General Assembly does not right
this injustice, the Supreme Court will fully reconsider their position in a future
case.
ELAINE TABOR MCPARLAND
87. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (1968). See also
Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 452, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 314, 563 P.2d 858, 870 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) ("The rights of a proposed new class of tort plaintiffshould be forthrightly judged on
their own merits, rather than by indulging in gloomy speculation on where it will all end.").
88. Gilmore, 85 N.C. App. at 73, 354 S.E.2d at 317.
89. See Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Per-
son's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 601-02 (1976).
90. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
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